

THE HONORABLE JAMES L. ROBART

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

**MARK A. ARTHUR, CIRILO MARTINEZ,
PARI NAJAFI, and HEATHER MCCUE, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated,**

Plaintiffs,

v.

SALLIE MAE, INC.,

Defendant.

JUDITH HARPER,

Plaintiff/Intervenor,

v.

ARROW FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC,

Defendant.

CLASS ACTION

NO. 10-cv-00198-JLR

**PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
RENEWED MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
AMENDED SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT**

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Mark A. Arthur, Cirilo Martinez, Pari Najafi, and Heather McCue (“Plaintiffs”)
 3 respectfully submit this supplemental memorandum in support of their renewed motion for
 4 preliminary approval of the Amended Settlement. This supplemental memorandum — and the
 5 revised Class Notice and Revocation Request Forms submitted herewith — addresses only those
 6 issues the Court identified in its January 10, 2012 Order (“January 10 Order”) (Dkt. No. 206).
 7 Plaintiffs otherwise rely on the previously submitted memorandum and related materials (Dkt.
 8 Nos. 184-88) in renewing their motion for preliminary approval.

9 In its January 10 Order, the Court determined that certification of a provisional settlement
 10 Class is appropriate and that the Amended Settlement is generally fair, but that changes to the
 11 proposed forms of Class Notice were necessary before preliminary approval of the Amended
 12 Settlement could be granted. Dkt. No. 206 at 12. The Court invited the Parties to submit a
 13 revised motion for preliminary approval addressing those changes to the Notices, and other issues
 14 identified by the Court. The Parties now do so.

15 First, with regard to Class Notice, the Court ruled that all Notices must list all 39 entities
 16 that did make, or are believed to have made, the calls at issue, rather than directing Class
 17 Members to the Settlement Website for a complete list of those entities. *Id.* at 19-20. That
 18 change has been made.

19 Second, the Court noted a discrepancy between the Class defined in the Amended
 20 Settlement Agreement and in the Notices. Specifically, the Class (properly) defined in the
 21 Amended Settlement Agreement does not include the words “without prior express consent”
 22 while the Class definition in the Notices included the language “without your prior express
 23 consent.” *Id.* at 20. The Parties have corrected all Notices to conform to the Class definition in
 24 the Amended Settlement Agreement.

25 Third, in response to a new argument raised by Intervenor Harper for the first time at oral
 26 argument, the Court requested briefing on the question of whether it is appropriate for the

1 Revocation Request Forms to require Class Members to provide an alternative, non-cellular
 2 telephone number notwithstanding protections set forth in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
 3 (“FDCPA”). *Id.* at 20. As detailed in Sallie Mae’s memorandum in support of the renewed
 4 motion for preliminary approval filed concurrently, nothing in this Settlement alters any Class
 5 Member’s right to request a “cease and desist” under the FDCPA. That is, those Class Members
 6 who were entitled to, and did previously, instruct Released Parties not to call them under the
 7 FDCPA, are not now undoing that instruction; similarly, those Class Members who may be
 8 entitled to give such an instruction now or in the future are not waiving their right to do so.
 9 Simply put, it is a non-issue.

10 Finally, the Court advised the Parties to submit with their renewed motion for preliminary
 11 approval information that will allow the Court to compare the Settlement Fund amount of \$24.15
 12 million to estimates of the maximum amount of damages recoverable in a successful action.
 13 January 10 Order at 23. As detailed below, while the maximum amount of damages that might be
 14 recoverable on behalf of a national litigation class probably runs to the billions of dollars, any
 15 such recovery is illusory, both factually and legally. Factually, obtaining — and then recovering
 16 on — a class judgment in the billions of dollars for purely statutory damages is, at best, unlikely.
 17 Legally, such a judgment would be vulnerable to nullification on Due Process grounds as out of
 18 proportion to the misconduct at issue, particularly in the context of a class action for statutory
 19 damages where the core claim is injunctive in nature. Plaintiffs considered these factual and legal
 20 issues, in addition to all the usual risks and difficulties attendant to certifying and maintaining
 21 certification of a nationwide class and prevailing on the merits of the TCPA claims, when
 22 negotiating the Settlement and the Amended Settlement.

23 For these reasons, and as detailed below and in Plaintiffs’ memorandum submitted on
 24 October 11, 2011 (Dkt. No. 184) and at the January 5, 2012 hearing, Plaintiffs respectfully
 25 request that the Court grant their renewed motion for preliminary approval of the Amended
 26 Settlement.

1 **II. ARGUMENT**

2 **A. Deficiencies in the Notices Identified By the Court Have Been Corrected.**

3 The Parties have corrected the Notices as directed by the Court, and Plaintiffs file the
4 revised Class Notices with this memorandum. Specifically, all Notices now contain a list of all
5 39 entities who did make, or are believed to have made, the calls at issue. *See* Exhibits C, D, E,
6 F, G, submitted concurrently with this memorandum. The Notices also no longer define the Class
7 as those who received automated calls “without [their] prior express consent.” *Id.*

8 **B. The Revocation Request Forms Do Not Conflict with the FDCPA.**

9 Sallie Mae discusses the Revocation Request Form issue in detail in its supplemental
10 memorandum. Two points are worth reiterating here:

11 First, Class Members’ rights under the FDCPA to request a cease and desist — past,
12 present, and future — are (and always have been) wholly unaffected by this Settlement. To the
13 extent any Class Members previously had the right to, and did, instruct any of the Released
14 Parties not to call them pursuant to the FDCPA, they are not abrogating that instruction by
15 providing the number on the Revocation Request Form here.

16 Second, to the extent any Class Members presently (or in the future) have the right to
17 instruct any of the Released Parties not to contact them pursuant to the FDCPA, nothing in this
18 Settlement precludes them from doing do.

19 To avoid any confusion on this point, the Parties have agreed to add language to the
20 Revocation Request Form. The Revocation Request Form now includes the following language:
21 “This Revocation Form relates only to the limitations of the TCPA and does not change your
22 rights under other federal or state statutes.” *See* Exhibit 1, submitted concurrently with this
23 memorandum.

24 **C. The Amended Settlement Fund is Reasonable Even in Light of the**
25 **Maximum Recoverable Damages.**

26 In its January 10 Order, the Court concluded that the Settlement Fund amount is within

1 the range of reasonableness for purposes of preliminary approval. Dkt. No. 206 at 23. The Court
 2 observed, however, that at any final fairness hearing, it will be required to compare the Settlement
 3 Fund amount to “estimates of the maximum amount of damages recoverable in a successful
 4 litigation,” and instructed the Parties to address this issue in any renewed motion for preliminary
 5 approval. Dkt. No. 206 at 23; *see also In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th
 6 Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s determination after fairness hearing that final approval of
 7 settlement was appropriate based in part on comparison of settlement amount with potential
 8 recovery).

9 Estimating the total potential recovery Plaintiffs might obtain on behalf of a nationwide
 10 litigation Class here is at once a matter of simple math and, to a large extent, an academic
 11 exercise. If Plaintiffs can successfully prove the TCPA violations alleged in the Third Amended
 12 Complaint on behalf of a certified class of 8 million members, the Class would be entitled to
 13 statutory damages running into billions of dollars. If Plaintiffs further prove that the offending
 14 calls were made willfully or knowingly, they could recover “up to” triple that amount, at the
 15 Court’s discretion. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (providing for treble damages “[i]f the court finds
 16 that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated” the TCPA). Accordingly, the maximum
 17 amount of damages Plaintiffs conceivably could recover for the Class pursuant to the TCPA
 18 easily surpasses \$12 billion.

19 The problem with ascribing significance to that analysis here is both factual and legal.

20 Factually, obtaining — and recovering on — a multibillion dollar judgment would likely
 21 be an impossibility. Setting aside the usual risks and difficulties attendant to obtaining and
 22 maintaining certification of a nationwide litigation class and then prevailing on the merits of the
 23 TCPA claim,¹ Sallie Mae would have every incentive to litigate appeals of any such judgment as

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 25 ¹ Other substantial risks associated with ongoing litigation of Plaintiffs’ claims include but are not
 26 limited to (1) the possibility that the Court could conclude that under the TCPA, the “prior
 express consent” allowing an entity to make autodialed calls need not be received at the time the
 loan originates but may instead be received any time during the multi-year life of the loan, *see*

1 far as possible over many years.

2 As a legal matter, Sallie Mae would have a strong argument that an award in the billions
3 of dollars in a statutory damages class action is out of proportion to its misconduct, and thus
4 implicates Due Process. *See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell*, 538 U.S. 408,
5 416 (2003) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of
6 grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.”); *Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co.*,
7 508 F.2d 226, 234 (9th Cir. 1974) (reversing class certification ruling where potential statutory
8 damages were “staggering” in the aggregate such that they would “shock the conscience” and
9 where plaintiffs could realistically pursue claims individually); *Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t*
10 *Co., L.P.*, 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003) (where aggregate statutory damages claims lead to
11 enormous awards, “it may be that in a sufficiently serious case the due process clause might be
12 invoked . . . to nullify that effect and reduce the aggregate damage award”); *Spikings v. Cost Plus,*
13 *Inc.*, No. 06-cv-8125, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44214, at *12-*13 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2007)
14 (refusing to certify class where class members did not suffer “actual harm” and where award of
15 even the minimum aggregate statutory damages would produce “disastrous consequences to
16 Defendant’s business and the thousands of Defendant’s employees that would be left without a
17 job if a class is certified in this case”).

18 Plaintiffs were very cognizant of these and other significant litigation risks when they

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20 *Moore v. Firstsource Advantage, LLC*, No. 07-CV-770, 2011 WL 4345703, *10 (W.D.N.Y. Sept.
21 15, 2011) (holding that “prior express consent” may be provided after an account is opened); (2)
22 the difficulty of certifying a litigation class in a TCPA case, *see Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc.*,
23 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1169 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (denying class certification of TCPA claims); *see also*
24 *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550-57 (2011) (reversing class certification
25 where plaintiffs failed to establish commonality); (3) the likelihood that Sallie Mae would seek to
26 compel individual arbitration of many Class Members’ claims in light of *AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, -- U.S. --, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); (4) the risks inherent in any jury trial; and (5) the risk that any favorable rulings, particularly on issues of first impression such as the definition of “prior express consent” under the TCPA, could be reversed on appeal. *See also* Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Amended Settlement Agreement at 24-25 (Dkt. No. 184). Sallie Mae’s success on any one of these multiple fronts would substantially reduce or entirely eliminate a class damages award.

1 negotiated the Settlement and the Amended Settlement and agreed to the \$24.15 million.

2 Plaintiffs submit that a more meaningful comparison in these circumstances is to other
3 TCPA settlements, and to the amount each Class member will likely receive based on the claims
4 rate. The Amended Settlement Agreement requires Sallie Mae to pay \$24.15 million, which is by
5 far the largest TCPA settlement of which Class counsel is aware. Based upon the claims data
6 from the original Settlement, and many other factors (detailed in Plaintiffs' October 11, 2011
7 brief in support of preliminary approval and the accompanying Selbin Declaration (Dkt. Nos. 184
8 at 13, 185 ¶ 12), each claimant is likely to receive \$20-\$40 each or more. Any Class Member
9 who received many calls and believes that amount is inadequate can opt out and retain an attorney
10 to file an individual lawsuit.

11 Importantly, Class Members are also entitled to the Amended Settlement's primary form
12 of relief: the right to end the automated calls made to them on their cellular telephones. This is
13 substantial and meaningful relief for *all* Class Members — negotiated during multiple arm's-
14 length mediation sessions by experienced counsel — that would not be possible in the absence of
15 the Amended Settlement.

16 In sum, while the maximum amount of damages Plaintiffs conceivably could win in a
17 successful trial of a nationwide litigation class runs to the many billions of dollars, that amount
18 likely is not "recoverable" at all, because it raises Due Process concerns. Coupled with the core
19 prospective relief of the Amended Settlement, and in light of the significant risks associated with
20 ongoing litigation, the Settlement Fund of \$24.15 million is reasonable and fair. Plaintiffs will be
21 prepared to address this issue further on final approval should the Court deem it necessary.

22 **III. CONCLUSION**

23 For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons stated in Plaintiffs' memorandum filed on
24 October 10, 2011 (Dkt. No. 184) and at the January 5, 2012 oral argument, Plaintiffs respectfully
25 request that the Court grant preliminary approval of the Amended Settlement.
26

1 Dated: February 9, 2012

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Beth E. Terrell, hereby certify that on February 9, 2012, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:

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